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Abstract
The recently launched Brazilian “forest certificates” market is expected to reduce environ-
mental compliance costs for landowners through an offset mechanism, after a long history
of conservation laws based in command-and-control and strict rules.
In this paper we assessed potential costs and evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the
instrument when introducing to this market constraints that aim to address conservation
objectives more specifically. Using the conservation planning software Marxan with Zones
we simulated different scopes for the “forest certificates” market, and compared their cost-
effectiveness with that of existing command-and-control (C&C), i.e. compliance to the Legal
Reserve on own property, in the state of São Paulo. The simulations showed a clear potential
of the constrained “forest certificates” market to improve conservation effectiveness and
increase cost-effectiveness on allocation of Legal Reserves. Although the inclusion of an
additional constraint of targeting the BIOTA Conservation Priority Areas doubled the cost
(+95%) compared with a “free trade” scenario constrained only by biome, this option was still
50% less costly than the baseline scenario of compliance with Legal Reserve at the property.
Introduction
Until recent, direct regulation has been the most important type of policy for biodiversity con-
servation in Brazil. The main command-and-control (C&C) instrument for forest conservation
is the Forest Code (FC), which amongst others requires, in the case of the state of São Paulo, a
Legal Reserve (LR) encompassing 20% (up to 80% in the Amazon) of the property area covered
with natural vegetation. Compliance has been low, with less than 10% of the farms claiming to
have Legal Reserves [1] due to the misconception from the agriculture sector of an incompati-
bility between agriculture development and conservation [2].
In order to reduce the economic impact on landowners some flexible instruments were
introduced and one of the most promising is a mechanism that allows the landowners who do
not comply with the 20% LR requirements to offset their deficit in another farm which has
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more natural vegetation than required. This instrument is called Environmental ReserveQuo-
tas (Portuguese acronym, CRA), hereafter referred also as “forest certificates”. The FC specifies
that the CRA is a certificate of ownership equivalent to an area of native vegetation and the cer-
tificate may be issued for any area of native vegetation exceeding the LR requirement [3]. The
expected role of the forest certificatesmarket is to reduce the costs with compliance to the
Legal Reserve requirements on private properties and to remunerate landowners who have nat-
ural vegetation on their farm above the Legal Reserve requirement. Trading in forest certificates
also can have the potential to reduce social inequalities by allowing revenue transfers to regions
that have low agriculture suitability and larger forest cover as such schemes are deemed to
increase social justice [4].
The CRA is an incentive-based instrument included in a recent amendment of the Forest
Code (2012), and still lacks full regulation defining for instance, the scope of the market. How-
ever, the current regulations establish that the CRA is only valid as a means of complying with
the minimum requirement on land currently below the requirement (due to past deforestation)
and that the areas must have equivalent extension and be part of the same Biome. In the case of
São Paulo, the government is tending to define in its regulation that all CRA should be traded
within the State to ensure a minimum area of Legal Reserve and reforestation within the State.
Recognizing the cases where there is lack of supply of Legal Reserve surplus area for compensa-
tion, the Law allows that deforested areas are used to issue forest certificates, but ties the accep-
tance of the compensation to the prior reforestation of the area.
In addition to maintaining a certain proportion of forest cover, the state of São Paulo faces
other conservation challenges. The state is the most industrialized and populated of Brazil, with
40 million inhabitants [5], and, at the same time, it has a vast biodiversity with many endemic
species [6] and the twomajor biomes found in the State, Atlantic Forest and Cerrado, are recog-
nized as global biodiversity hotspots [7] (S1 Fig) due to the high pressure and threat of extinction
[8]. Only 14% of original area of Atlantic Forest [9] and 10% of Cerrado are left, hence conserva-
tion priority criteria are urgently needed in the design of conservation instruments.
The potential of market-based instruments such as CRA to contribute to a policymix for
biodiversity conservation has been recently assessed by many studies [3, 4, 10, 11, 12]. In Brazil,
CRA studies have focused on the national level [11, 13, 10, 14], the state level [15, 16, 17] and
some have had a theoretical approach [18, 19, 20]. Especially, Soares-Filho and colleagues pro-
vide a comprehensive review on the CRAmarket, analysing different regulatory scenarios and
the consequences on carbon balance [3]. The study finds that the Atlantic Forest of São Paulo
is one of the areas with potential carbon efficiencygains with CRA.
These studies have showed that although the instrument is not a panacea for forest biodiver-
sity conservation, CRAmay lead to gains in cost-effectiveness under specific ecological and
socioeconomiccircumstances [19, 3]. For instance, CRA has the potential to take advantage of
differences in the agricultural suitability of the land and in the resulting opportunity costs of
biodiversity conservation.Hence, the total area of Legal Reserves can potentially be achieved at
lower overall opportunity cost [2], but the magnitude of these gains will rely on the level of con-
straint of the market, i.e. the narrower the market, the lower the variation in opportunity costs.
However, to our knowledge, no studies have explicitly incorporated spatially explicit biodiver-
sity conservation priorities to explore outcomes in terms of conservation effectiveness, nor
have the potential impacts on the cost-effectiveness of varyingCRAmarket constraints been
explored in the literature. Thereby, there are trading possibilities along with their legal and
operational constraints that could harness economic and environmental benefits [12] that have
not yet been assessed. Another relevant aspect for policy design that deservesmore attention is
the potential of CRA in terms of cost reduction and gains in conservation cost-effectiveness
compared to a baseline situation of Forest Law compliance, i.e. reforestation on own property.
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The aim of the study is to assess the cost-effectiveness potential of trading in Legal Reserve
within the state of São Paulo to simulate Legal Reserve compliance in three different scenarios
with different configuration of policies and market restrictions to define the allocation of the
forest LR certificates. The first scenario is the ‘Baseline’ where we simulate the compliance with
LR based only on the Forest Law regulation (C&C), without CRA, i.e. reforestation in situ of
LR deficits. In Scenario 2, we simulate the compliance with LR considering the CRAmarket
under the current regulation, i.e. trade within São Paolo State and within biome of forest certifi-
cates from surplus and reforestation areas. In Scenario 3, a variation of the CRAmarket that
constrains the CRA from areas for reforestation within the conservation priority areas desig-
nated by the BIOTA program [21], as a measure to increase conservation effectiveness.
Specifically, we test at the state scale, the hypothesis that the larger the spatial market for for-
est certificates, the greater the opportunity cost differentials and the greater the economic arbi-
trage opportunities in a market, which would result in smaller compliance costs, as already
assessed at national scale [3]. Our related hypothesis is that if costs and conservation values are
heterogeneous and positively correlated, increasing market size increases cost-effectiveness.
Hence, the allocation of forest certificates by the CRAmarket will result in more forest area
reforested in areas of top priority for conservation, leading to higher conservation effectiveness
compared to the baseline scenario of in situ reforestation. We also hypothesize that restricting
the market by a minimum set of conservation criteria can improve conservation cost-effective-
ness since the correspondence of opportunity cost differentials and the gain in biodiversity
conservation is not perfect [22]. Thereby, restricting the CRAmarket within conservation pri-
ority areas can disproportionately increase conservation cost-effectiveness compared to a sce-
nario of a market without such restrictions.
Materials and Methods
We first mapped the distribution of LR deficit and surplus and then used these maps to identify
the area of ‘new LR’, i.e. reforestation areas within the own property (in situ compliance, sce-
nario 1), and areas allocated through forest certificates (scenarios 2 and 3). In scenarios 2 and
3, both existing forest patches (surplus areas) and reforestation were considered. In scenarios 2
and 3, all surplus areas were allocated first to new LR, following the assumption that the CRA
market would trade the existing surplus areas first, since they are less costly (no associated
reforestation costs). The remaining LR deficit (here after, net deficit) in scenarios 2 and 3 was
allocated to new LR by using a conservation planning tool, Marxan with Zones [23, 24]. It allo-
cated the equivalent to the net deficit area to areas for reforestation within the State and within
biome (scenario 2), and additionally, within high priority areas for conservation in scenario 3,
while minimizing opportunity costs. After the allocation of new LR, we calculated the total
opportunity cost of new LR and of in situ reforestation areas, and related costs to a metrics of
conservation effectiveness in order to compare the cost-effectiveness among the different
scenarios.
Spatial distribution of deficit and surplus areas
We used a database from a state agricultural census (LUPA) [20] with data about the area with
forest in each of the approximately 320 thousand Units of Agricultural Production (UPA),
which is largely equivalent to a farm, for São Paulo State. We calculated the deficit and surplus
of LR for each UPA, according to the reference value of 20% of LR required by law for the
Atlantic Forest and Cerrado biomes. The database has a complete description of all areas of
natural vegetation and fragile ecosystems on each property (e.g. forest, foodplain, swamps,
etc.). Most of these should be protected as Permanent Protected Area (Portuguese acronym,
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APP) as required by the Forest Code. Also, the Forest Code in its Art.15 allows the addition of
all APP in the calculation of Legal Reserve in the property, so we considered all those areas as
LR.
In order to comply with confidentiality requirements, the UPAs were aggregated using a
grid of hexagons of 500 hectare each, resulting in 50,600 planning units which were used as the
spatial unit of the further analyses.
Landowners with properties sized below 4 fiscalmodules, an unit of measurement used in
Brazil that in Sao Paulo represents 20ha on average, which have less than 20% of LR do not
need to buy ‘forest certificates’ nor to carry out reforestation in order to be compliant. How-
ever, not more than 80% of their property can be deforested. In addition, all the forest area in
these properties can be considered a “surplus” for the CRAmarket. Thereby, these farmers can
participate in the CRAmarket, but only as sellers. However, we were not able to eliminate the
UPAs with less than 4 fiscal modules from the sample in the aggregated data we used.
Calculation of opportunity cost
We use land value as a proxy for the opportunity cost of forest conservation, under the assump-
tion that it reflects the present value of foregone agriculture production.We suggest that this is
a practical proxy indicator for the willingness to accept payment for the CRA. A recent contin-
gent valuation survey [3] showed that land prices are a proxy for the willingness to accept and
to pay for a CRA, reflecting direct and indirect uses and non uses values for contracts of 30
years or more; the same study argued that for short-term contracts farmers tend to refer more
often to land rent prices.
Land value data were based on summary statistics on market price per hectare from the
bare land value (BLV) database [25], compiled semi-annually. In this database, for groups of
municipalities (EDR), maximum, minimum and average land values are reported for different
categories of land use suitability.
In order to associate land value from EDRs to land productivity we overlaid a map on
administrative units and a map of land suitability for agriculture [26] (Figure A in S1 File),
joining Land Categories with maximum, minimum and average land prices from the BLV land
price database (Table A in S1 File). We assumed that at the municipality level, accessibility of
the land was the main determinant of land prices within land-use classes. Thereby, the maxi-
mum, minimum and average land prices corresponding to each land categories class was
assigned according to distance to infrastructure.Distance to infrastructure (here considered as
roads and urban areas) was used as a von Thunen type proxy for accessibility to agricultural
markets [27] (Figure B in S1 File). We applied a “cost distance” measure calculated with the r.
cost module in GRASS GIS 6.4.2, that takes accessibility constraints of the landscape into
account producing a frictionmap where rivers were treated as “barriers” and the friction of the
terrain was defined as the squared slope in degrees.
A recent study of forest certificatemarket at the national level in Brazil used a similar proce-
dure of assigningminimum and maximum land prices to three land-use categories [3]. In their
study, municipalities with missing land prices were assigned land values through spatial (lin-
ear) interpolation to produce a continuous land value map. In our study, we replaced linear
interpolation by a more heterogeneous and non-linear cost distance calculation. For each com-
bination of municipalities and land use suitability classes, we then assigned the 25% of the pix-
els within this planning unit, which were closest to infrastructure (< 1st quartile of the cost
distance raster) to the respectivemax-value reported in the BLV database. The min-value was
assigned to those 25% of the planning units with the greatest distance to infrastructure (> 3rd
quartile of the cost distance raster). The remaining intermediate cost distance locations were
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assigned average land market prices. The use of min-max land value statistics entails informa-
tion loss relative to a time series of land market prices [3], but it is the only opportunity cost
data available at a State scale. The lower and upper threshold of 25% of pixel cost-distance for
assigningmin and max land prices was chosen arbitrarily, as is the case of linear interpolation
used in other studies. While opportunity costs as assigned here are expected to be both too
high and too low at property level, the error distribution across a large number of analysis units
is expected to be normally distributed (according to central limit theorem). However, assign-
ment of thresholds still preserves the rank ordering of priority locations of Marxan with Zones.
The above steps resulted in a map (Fig 1) with costs per hectare varying from R$1,2 thou-
sand to R$50 thousand. The resulting cost layer is based on potential agricultural returns and
does not account for any forestry values that may be realised on properties.
Criteria of conservation effectiveness
We used the map of Priority Areas for Conservation and Restoration produced by BIOTA [21]
as a criteria for conservation effectiveness. This map, which has been the keystone of conserva-
tion planning in the State, compiles 20 years of biodiversity and ecological data. To date 15
Fig 1. Distribution of opportunity costs of conservation in São Paulo. Opportunity costs of land varies from R$5,000 (lighter) to R$50,000
(darker) R$ per hectare in São Paulo, based on prices for cleared land. It was used as the cost criteria in the simulation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164850.g001
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governmental decrees and resolutions have based their recommendations for conservation pri-
orities on the BIOTA/FAPESP program [6].
The BIOTA map classifies the State of São Paulo in classes of priority for conservation and
restoration ranging from 0 (low priority) to 8 (high priority). The amount of new Legal
Reserves in the top priority classes, between 5 and 8 (Fig 2), were used as our indicator for con-
servation effectiveness, i.e. more forest certificates allocated on high priority areas entailed
more effective conservation. In the case of net deficits that require reforestation, we argue that
restoration performed on areas with higher priority for conservationwould, ceteris paribus,
also result in higher conservation effectiveness.
CRA market allocation simulations
We usedMarxan with Zones software [23, 24] to allocate land units to fulfil reforestation defi-
cits at minimum cost of different market allocations of CRA in scenarios 2 and 3. We chose
Marxan because the software:
Fig 2. Priority areas for biodiversity conservation and restoration. Map adapted from BIOTA priority for conservation and restoration map [6],
showing top priority areas for conservation and restoration in black (categories 5 to 8) and the rest of the state in white (categories 0 to 3). These two
classes were used as criteria for conservation effectiveness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164850.g002
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1. finds solutions for allocating forest certificates at minimal costs, which represents the behav-
iour we expect of an efficientmarket with no transaction costs and where agents (landhold-
ers) have information regarding the distribution of opportunity costs and,
2. has the functionality to provide multiple near optimal solutions to meet conservation objec-
tives [28]. This means that the algorithm does not produce one single optimal solution but
many different alternatives an efficientmarket could allocate the required amount of Legal
Reserve based on costs. We consider that this is a more realistic situation than to simulate a
market as if there existed one optimal solution, which contrasts with an equilibriummodel
approach used in previous studies about CRAmarket [3]. Furthermore, the multi-solution
output of Marxan with Zones provides additional information about whether there are
many equally cheap or good alternatives (flexibility) and therewith how likely it is that the
market will end up with a solution similar to those simulated, both in terms of costs and
conservation outcomes.
In our scenarios, we usedMarxan to allocate a fixed amount of a conservation feature that
in our case, corresponded to a target set by the net deficit of LR area per biome. Hence, the
application was used for the spatial allocation of the targeted feature within the available areas,
constrained by the criteria of minimizing costs.
We usedMarxan with Zones v2.1, for scenario allocation. The preparation and analysis of
the spatial data were performed using ArcGis (ArcView v9.2), Quantum GIS v1.7.3 and
GRASS v6.4.2.
Scenario definition
In the baseline scenario we only considered reforestation of the deficit within each property as
the option to comply with the Legal Reserve. In scenarios 2 and 3, we used a combination of
forests certificates from surplus and reforestation areas.
Scenario 1: Baseline (in situ compliance): All area of deficits in the planning units were
assumed to be reforested and set as new LR. The new LR area was thenmultiplied by the oppor-
tunity cost per hectare to get the total cost of the scenario. Next, we overlapped the new LRmap
with the BIOTA map to assess in which priority class for conservation the new LR were located.
Scenario 2: CRAmarket under current regulation:We considered that forest certificates
would be allocated first to the surplus area (existing forests) within biomes. This area was mul-
tiplied by the corresponding opportunity costs to obtain the cost for new LR from surplus
areas. Then, for each biome, we calculated the remaining deficit (net deficit) by deducting the
surplus area from the deficit, in order to estimate the area needed for reforestation. Marxan
with Zones was then used to allocate forest certificates for reforestation to fulfil the net deficit
(the optimization target) in each Atlantic Forest and Cerrado, respectively. We defined two
zones: the areas available and not available for allocation of forest certificates for reforestation.
All planning units in the state of São Paulo (except urban areas, water bodies, existing forest
remnants and existing protected areas) were considered to be available for the allocation to
new LR using CRA from restoration areas. Each planning unit had two attributes: total oppor-
tunity cost (calculated as the opportunity cost per hectare multiplied by the area of each plan-
ning unit) and type of biome (Atlantic Forest or Cerrado).Marxan then selected planning
units that reached the net deficit target in both biomes at least cost. We ran Marxan for 100
possible solutions of allocation of forest certificateswith the lowest costs. For the calculation of
the total opportunity cost for this scenario, we selected the best solution—i.e. the one achieving
the net deficit target with the smallest opportunity cost—and added the calculated opportunity
cost of the surplus LR area.
Constraining Forest Certificate’s Market to Improve Conservation Cost-Effectiveness
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Scenario 3: CRAmarket restricted within BIOTA priority areas: We performed the same
steps as in scenario 2, but, including the restriction of allocationwithin each biome in the state,
and within areas of high priority for conservation/restoration (BIOTA classes 5 to 8). Thereby,
the difference between scenario 2 and 3 is the constraint on where the forest certificates from res-
toration areas could be allocated. The planning units in theMarxan analysis had an extra feature
indicating the priority class, and we excluded those planning units with class 0 to 4 from the
units available for forest certificates allocation. The targets for Atlantic Forest and Cerradowere
defined as the net deficit per biome after discounting the surplus areas, as in scenario 2.
The three scenarios were compared based on the level of opportunity costs, conservation
effectiveness—the area (ha) of forest certificates allocated under high-priority conservation
classes (5 to 8), and of cost-effectiveness, by dividing the area of high-priority classes by the




Our results show that natural vegetation covers 13.3% of all the rural area in State as defined by
the LUPA [20] census, which represents a state-level deficit of 6.7% of Legal Reserve, equivalent
to around 1.3 million hectares.
However, the distribution of the natural vegetation is very uneven within the State. Some
areas are totally covered by natural vegetation, while others have 100% of crop plantation. The
analysis at the planning unit level shows that 17,096 units have an area of natural vegetation
larger than the required by law, a total of 928 thousand hectares of “surplus”, of which 762
thousand are at Atlantic Forest and 166 thousand at Cerrado (S3 Fig). On the other hand,
35,882 units have an area of natural vegetation smaller than required by law, with a total of 2.3
million hectares of “deficit” (Fig 3). This total deficit of Legal Reserve is distributed across 1.4
million hectares in the Atlantic Forest and 801 thousand hectares in the Cerrado (S4 Fig). The
surplus/deficit ratio for the Atlantic Forest is 1/2 (one hectare of surplus for 2 hectares of defi-
cit) and for the Cerrado is a ratio of 1/5 (one hectare of surplus for 5 hectares of deficit).
Scenarios results
In all scenarios, the target of total deficit area (2.3 million hectares) was allocated finding plan-
ning units adding up to the same amount of area as “new Legal Reserves”. Scenario 1, without
CRA, was the one with the highest market value, with total opportunity costs of R$37 billion.
Scenario 2, that includes forest certificate trading constrained only by biome resulted in consid-
erably lower costs, R$8.9 billion. The Scenario 3 including constraints for top priority areas for
conservation, had a cost of R$17.4 billion (Table 1). These values do not represent the amount
that the landowners will have to pay to be compliant (buying or renting CRA) as the value is
only a proxy of the costs. The most important result is the relative value among scenarios.
With regards to the representation of the new Legal Reserves in high priority areas for con-
servation, Scenario 1 had 38% of the new Legal Reserves concentrated in priority class 3, and
19% in priority classes 2 and 4. Only 12% of the new Legal Reserveswere located in areas of top
priority classes (5–8) (Fig 4 and Table B in S1 File).
When compared to the baseline scenario, the Scenario 2 showed a reduction in costs of 76%
and the Scenario 3, a reduction of 53% (Fig 5). Compared to the baseline scenario, Scenario 2
presents an increase in conservation effectiveness of 22%, while Scenario 3 presented a very
high increase (440%), as expected by the inclusion of the constraint.
Constraining Forest Certificate’s Market to Improve Conservation Cost-Effectiveness
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The Scenario 1 resulted in a cost-effectiveness of 7.45 high priority hectares/millionR$ (Fig
5). The Scenario 2 resulted in a cost-effectiveness ratio of 37.81 high priority hectares/millionR
$ and the Scenario 3, 85.46 hectares/millionR$.
The costs mentioned for Scenarios 2 and 3 include the best allocation of reforestation areas
calculated by Marxan considering the lowest cost and the constraints imposed. However, we
expect that a real market solution will likely be far from the best optimal solution. For this rea-
son, we analysed the frequency of selection of each planning unit as new Legal Reserve for
reforestation among the 100 possible Marxan solutions.
In Scenario 2 (Fig 6), the areas selected in the lowest cost allocation of Marxan are concen-
trated in the western and central parts of the State, with some patches in the northern and east-
ern area. In Scenario 3, the areas selected in the best run are concentrated in the central and
northern parts, with only 16% of coincidence areas between the two scenarios.
We summarized these results with a “flexibility index”, defined as the number of selected
planning units divided by the average selection frequency (>0) of all planning units, in order
to compare the availability of good alternatives. It resulted in a flexibility index of 805.3 for Sce-
nario 2 and 872.7 for Scenario 3. This result indicates that despite the constraint of availability
of areas in conservation priority areas, Scenario 3 has a larger set of available good alternatives
compared to Scenario 2.
Fig 3. Area of deficit, surplus and net deficit per Biome in State of Sao Paulo. The bars show the area of surplus (dark grey). deficit (light
grey), and net deficit (grey) of Legal Reserve (in thousand hectares) per Biome in State of Sao Paulo.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164850.g003
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Discussion
High potential of improving cost-effectiveness
The results indicate high cost-effectiveness of the forest certificate trading and a high potential
to both reduce compliance costs–as measured by opportunity costs—and improve the conser-
vation effectiveness of the Legal Reserve compliance. The inclusion of forest certificate trading
within biomes reduced compliance costs with Legal Reserve by 76% compared with a scenario
of compliance with reforestation of deficit at the property without trade (Scenario 1). Although
the inclusion of a new constraint targeting the BIOTA Conservation and Restoration Priority
Areas almost doubled the cost (+95%) compared with a “free trade” scenario constrained only
by biome, it was still 50% less costly than the baseline scenario of compliance.
Besides having the largest cost and the least efficient result in targeting conservationpriority
areas, the Scenario 1 has the disadvantage of leaving 762 and 166 thousand hectares of Atlantic
Forest and Cerrado forest remnants surpluses, respectively, without protection by law as Legal
Reserves.These areas are usuallymarginal agricultural lands, with very low opportunity cost and
with conditions that have made them of limited interest to deforestation until now. But, many are
still very important for biodiversity conservation as indicated by BIOTA. Also, compliance through
reforestation could displace the demand of land for agriculture and some of themore productive of
these forested areas could suffer an increased deforestation pressure due to leakage effects [29].
Conservation outcomes of a market constraint
The proposed inclusion of a constraint on CRAmarket targeting the BIOTA priority areas sim-
ulated in Scenario 3 showed substantially larger conservation gains relative to the increase in
Table 1. Summary of scenario results.
New Legal Reserves Effectiveness
(hectares)







Scenario 1 Reforestation Atlantic
Forest
1,496 21,3 - -
Cerrado 801 15,7
Total 2,297 37,0 275,993 7,45
Scenario 2 Surplus Atlantic
Forest






Total 2,297 8,9 336,168 37,81
Scenario 3 Surplus Atlantic
Forest






Total 2,297 17,5 1,489,507 85,46
The table shows the amount of new Legal Reserves (either by reforestation or surplus of forest from another property) in each biome and scenario. It also
shows the total costs, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness ratio of each scenario.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164850.t001
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costs, compared to the reference scenario with no forest certificates trading. This led to consid-
erable increase in conservation effectiveness and resulted in the most cost-effective option.
This result complement findings in a previous study [3] showing that while restrictions in mar-
ket size raise total compliance costs, they also reduce the potential for carbon leakage, and are
in agreement with studies indicating the potential for increasing conservation cost-effective-
ness due to a disproportional correspondence between conservation gains and cost increments
[22].
According to the selection frequency results, the selected areas for new Legal Reserves in
Scenarios 2 and 3, overlap only in 16%. This result indicates that high priority areas for conser-
vation are also more expensive (in opportunity costs), and that a constraint only within biomes
will likely produce an outcome which does not fully reflect conservation priorities. This is not
unexpected since areas of high conservation value are likely to coincide spatially with areas
with high agricultural productivity, where the pressure of human activities is highest, and con-
sequently, where the most threatened nature occurs. The result also illustrates the importance
of a policymix that combines market and regulatory instruments [30, 31], since market forces
Fig 4. New Legal Reserves by classes of priority for restoration, by scenario. The bars show the relative distribution of new Legal Reserves selected in
each class of priority for conservation (0 to 8, being 8 the highest), in each of the three scenarios.Scenario 2 had a similar result in terms of the area of new
Legal Reserves in top priority classes (14%), but resulted in a higher representation of very low priority classes (i.e. increased representation of class 0 from
0.1% to 9%). In Scenario 3 more than 64% of the new Legal Reserves were located in classes of top priority for restoration, 5 to 8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164850.g004
Constraining Forest Certificate’s Market to Improve Conservation Cost-Effectiveness
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alone will tend towards nature protection areas only on lands that are unprofitable for agricul-
tural production [4].
In the scenarios where trade is assumed, the option of buying forest certificates allocated in
properties investing in reforestation above the required 20% of area protection is especially
Fig 5. Total costs, conservation effectiveness and cost-effectiveness ratio, by scenario. The graph shows the total
costs (grey columns, in billion R$) and the total area (black columns, in million hectares) of new Legal Reserves in top priority
areas, by scenario. The rhombus show the ratio between these two values, resulting in the cost-effectiveness of each
scenario (hectares of priority areas per million R$).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164850.g005
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important in states such as São Paulo where the surplus area is smaller than the area of deficits,
and where reforestation is necessary for compliance. However, it is still not regulated by law,
and there are some questions under discussion at the State level: i.e. how much time after the
plantation is needed for a reforestation area to be considered “reforested” and valid for trading
in a forest certificatemarket? Lacking regulation on these issues makes opportunity costs esti-
mations of reforestation options speculative at present as reforestation costs may vary from US
$760 to US$20,000 per hectare [32] depending on the alternatives chosen. Also, considering
the conservation importance, an area of forest remnants is often richer in biodiversity and have
higher conservation value than a new planted forest. The researcher community also argues
that even strict requirements about methods of plantation may be insufficient to guarantee
the success of a reforestation project, i.e. to be self-sustaining in the mid- to long term [33].
Further studies should be conducted comparing the costs and benefits of forest certificate
Fig 6. Allocation results of Scenarios 1 and 2. Results from Marxan show distribution of selected area for new Legal Reserves in the best run (lowest
cost) of scenario 2 (blue) and scenario 3 (green). The map also highlights (in red) the coincidence areas selected in scenarios 2 and 3. The black
polygons are the borders of the top priority areas for conservation / restoration.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164850.g006
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trading with the other options for compliance for landowners, such as natural regeneration
and reforestation.
Data limitation
The database used in the analysis imposed some limitations regarding the size of the properties
and on the consequences of farm size for the legal reserve calculations. However, up to date it
is the only-state wide and georeferenced database available with data for each property. Other
studies have overcome limitations due to the lack of a unified land registry by using watersheds
as a proxy for rural properties [3, 34]. Although this method has showed an acceptable level of
uncertainty for national level analysis, we consideredmore accurate to use property data from
LUPA [20] available for the state of São Paulo. The new national Environmental Rural Register
(CAR), created by law in 2012, has the potential to be a great source of data for further analysis
of economic instruments and environmental policy. Although it already represents 81% of the
area subject to registration in Brazil [35] the database is still not publicly available.
Implications for policy
Due to the current very low implementation of the Legal Reserve and pendency on regulation,
trading in forest certificatemust be consideredmore as a potential instrument than as an exist-
ing one. Besides its potential highlighted in our results, a number of caveats must be taken into
account. First, the alternatives between a wide scope and little regulatedmarket on one hand,
and a spatially restricted and regulated trade scheme on the other, has to be considered care-
fully. As our study shows, the implementation of trading in forest certificates could reduce the
costs for landowners without rendering cost-effective results for conservation.On the other
hand, trading restrictedwithin the same biome and watershed as the previous version of the
Forest Codewould reduce cost heterogeneity of land potentially participating and the possibili-
ties of arbitrage, including the margins necessary to sustain intermediaries to make a trading
scheme work. The issue of the scope of the market is relevant given that each of the Brazilian
states must pass regulation with or without barring CRA trade beyond their borders, and even
the State of São Paulo it is still under debate. The importance of the cost heterogeneity across
properties for arbitrage on cost differentials between buyers and sellers depends on characteris-
tics of landscapes in a market and equilibrium effects of the ratio of supply to demand. Using a
market equilibriummodel Soares-Filho and colleagues [3] demonstrate how total opportunity
costs can actually decrease when trading is allowed with states in Amazonia with a large poten-
tial surplus of forest certificates. In their analysis, the large supply would seem to dominate the
effects of cost-differential resulting from expanding the area of the market. Further analysis
could document the optimal spatial extent of the market in terms of landscape heterogeneity
and cost-differentials.
However, critical to the implementation of the Law is its conservation outcomes. Our analy-
sis included a scenario showing one possible constraint inclusion that specifically targeted pri-
ority areas for conservation and very significantly increase cost-effectiveness.Based on
biodiversity conservation values, our findings suggest more cost-effectivenesswith spatially
restrictedmarkets, reinforcing the findings based on market equilibrium effects and carbon
leakage [3]. There is the need for further study adding biodiversity constraints to the assess-
ment of the size of forest certificatemarkets for Brazil as a whole, especially when analysed in a
context of policymixes with the potential to strengthen synergies betweenmultiple objectives
of conservation policies. Schröter and colleagues [22] for instance, studied spatial trade-offs
among various ecosystem services provided by forests and showed that carbon sequestration
targets could easily be achieved at low opportunity costs in contrast to certain biodiversity
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features, whose conservationwas more costly, and argued for an inverse logic to the current
international debate where carbon sequestration is targeted and (unmeasured) biodiversity
conservation is seen as a co-benefit (see also [36]).
In addition, forest certificate trading requires institutional capacity to achieve the cost-effec-
tiveness potential suggested by our modelling results. The new system to register the Environ-
mental Rural Register, called SICAR, will be essential for administering Legal Reserve
compliance and the forest certificatesmarket. Third, perhaps the most important issue is the
creation of demand. Biodiversity offset schemes such as this CRAmarket require a demand
stimulated by a regulation of a cap or minimum reserve requirement [12, 18]. The environ-
mental protection of such a system lies in the enforcement of the cap [37]. The forest certificate
trading case in Brazil is an example of an existing economic conservation instrument that has
not been implemented due to the lack of demand caused by lack of enforcement of the Legal
Reserve. The last change in the Legal Reserve requirements, creating the CRAmarket has
brought about the expectation of an increased enforcement of the law and has led to increased
interest in compliance by property owners.
Importance of a policy mix approach
These points highlight the importance of a policymix approach for the design and implemen-
tation of cost-effective biodiversity conservation policies. In this approach, policymakers have
a key role in combining different instruments to target the conservation objectives and to
ensure its economic viability. Our modelling results show that CRA has potentially low incre-
ments in costs compared to the benefits for conservation, but it is potentially difficult to imple-
ment politically. One possible solution is to introduce targeted Payments for Ecosystem
Services (PES) to increase conservation effectiveness of the market without increasing costs for
landowners. For example, the State government could stimulate landowners to allocate the
new Legal Reserves in priority areas offering to pay for the difference in opportunity costs that
might exist. Alternatively, the State could buy land in priority regions to create new public Pro-
tected Areas and sell the quotas in the market, financing the creation of the protected areas and
intervening in the allocation of the market. In some States where there is excess of supply of
surplus LR the forest certificates could also be adapted to serve as a common financial mecha-
nism for a wide variety of PES programs, in a concept of a X-CRA [3] multiplying environmen-
tal benefits of CRA beyond FC obligation. Several possibilities for instrument combinations
should be addressed by policymakers and studied to find cost-effective and feasible solutions to
fit each region.
Conclusions
The results of our evaluation of the potential effect of the forest certificatesmarket in the State
of São Paulo show a clear potential to both reduce Legal Reserve compliance costs and improve
conservation effectiveness compared to a pure command-and-control approach of Legal
Reserves compliance without trading.
The inclusion of trading within each biome reduces compliance costs by 76% compared
with the baseline of no trading. Although the inclusion of a new constraint targeting the Prior-
ity Areas almost doubled the cost (+95%) compared with Scenario 2 of “free trade” constrained
only by biome, it was still 50% less costly than the baseline. The proposed scenario also showed
substantially larger conservation gains relative to the increase in costs resulting in the most
cost-effective option. Our analysis contributes to the literature on assessment of market-based
instruments (MBI) to complement regulatory instruments reducing costs and/or improving
effectiveness of the conservation policies using a policymix analyses perspective.Our analysis
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of biodiversity conservation priorities and opportunity costs suggests that trading is more cost-
effectivenesswith markets restricted to targeting conservation priorities. Higher per hectare
costs are offset by higher conservation effectiveness.Our findings complement those who show
that more spatially restrictedmarkets lead to higher prices, but also lower carbon leakage [3].
We also show how cost-effectiveness analysis of mixes of regulatory and market-based instru-
ments can be assessed using Marxan with Zones, complementing other modelling approaches.
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